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 ABSTRACT 
Situation awareness plays a critical role in all battlefields. It monitors activities, and 
provides essential information about the battle. It is an operational requirement, high in 
demand, for the forces to fight the battle smartly and accomplishing the objectives set 
with minimal casualties. Situation awareness enhances survivability of the fighting forces 
by avoiding adversary detection and acquisition, achieved via the deployment of a variety 
of sensors that are part of an effective and integrated ISR system network. 
This thesis analyzes the impact of ISR system effectiveness and integration on 
unit survivability, in the context of a combined arms unit. The study was approached 
using the Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube to generate design points for simulation 
study. Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) was used to simulate the behavior of 
the units in the combined arms unit. During simulation, the parameters are varied to 
create a changing situation picture, as perceived by the troops. This determines the 
impact on survivability, by measuring the force exchange ratio between the RED and 
BLUE force, once the simulation is completed. The sensor capabilities and level of 
integration between the ISR sensors in the combined arms unit are analyzed based on the 
simulation results. 
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Advanced technology and capabilities enable and create opportunities to realize holistic 
battlespace awareness, which is a critical role in all battlefields. However, the biggest 
challenge remains the ability to synchronize both effectiveness and capabilities of the 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems for the intended mission. 
Situation awareness of the battlefield needs to be achieved through effective and and 
proper integrated ISR network, where its effectiveness is determined by its utility to 
decision superiority. 
While military organizations may seem obsessed with the notion of achieving ISR 
system integration, in reality, it is not easily achievable. Integration of a wide array of 
sensors is in fact challenging, if there are no appropriate measures and policies in place, 
such as DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel 
and Facilities), STANAGs (STANdard Agreements) and NIIA (NATO Intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance Interoperability Architecture). The task of information 
sharing and hence integration of ISR systems based on its architecture framework, 
interoperability policies as well as some form of evaluation tools help to determine, if not 
ensure the overall effectiveness of such integration efforts. 
This thesis builds upon a capstone project in Systems Engineering by studying the 
impact of situation awareness on ground combat unit survivability. Expanding on the 
capstone team’s work, one of the identified functions, “Provide Situation Awareness” 
forms the main focus of this thesis. Additionally, through the re-use of the model and 
operational scenario developed by Major Tobias Treml in his thesis, the overall results of 
this study determine how situation awareness may impact force protection and vehicle 
survivability. 
The study was approached using a few tools to generate the parameters for 
simulation analysis. One is: Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) utilizing Vitech 
CORE® to provide the overall framework necessary for uncovering the system-level 
relationships of the system. With it, the ISR system architecture can be studied by 
 xv 
 decomposing it down to its system-functions level, and by mapping out its various 
interactions and relationships. 
Another is Quality Function Deployment (QFD) table to facilitate the translation 
of a set of subjective requirements into a set of system-level requirements. In this thesis, 
the ISR system parameters are identified and mapped, against the sub-systems in the 
Combined Arms Unit (CAU). The mapping reveals the parameters to be modeled under 
those specific sub-components. QFD table also shows traceability of the modeled 
parameters and their impact on mission effectiveness of the combined arms unit. 
Additionally, advanced Design of Experiments (DOE), such as the Nearly 
Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH), was used to generate design points of these 
identified ISR system parameters for subsequent simulation. A total of 10,950 simulation 
runs were generated based on 365 design points with 30 replications each. A correlation 
study was carried out on the generated design points to ensure they are of low correlation. 
Finally, a modeling and simulation tool such as Map Aware Non-uniform 
Automata (MANA) was used to simulate the behavior of the units in the combined arms 
unit, and by varying parameters, the impact on the unit survivability can be analyzed. 
During simulation, the parameters are varied to create a changing of situation awareness 
level received by the troops. This determines the impact on situation awareness based on 
the force exchange ratio between the RED and BLUE once the simulation is completed. 
The sensor capabilities and level of integration between the ISR sensors in the combined 
arms unit are analyzed based on the simulation results. 
The results from the Force Exchange Ratio (FER) calculation revealed outgoing 
communication accuracy of Infantry and Armored Vehicles, sensor classification 
accuracy of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), the number of UAVs, as well as UAV 
latency to have the most influence on situation awareness. The high FER reflects lesser 
BLUE force being annihilated during the battle and hence implying a better flow of 
information among the agents during the process. The result also shows that information 
of interest on monitored area(s) once properly integrated and shared among the units in 
the combined arms unit will result in enhanced situation awareness. 
 xvi 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
“It is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the 
highest intelligence of the army for the purposes of spying, and thereby 
they achieve great results.” 
– Sun Tzu 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) is often referred to as tactical 
enabling operations, comprising a broad category of activities designed to support 
intelligence development, planning and decision-making. Its functions remain principal 
elements of the United States’ defense capabilities (Best 2005), which include a wide 
variety of systems capable of acquiring and processing information needed by national 
security decisionmakers, and battlefield commanders. These elements make ISR systems 
the integral components both at the national policy, and military level (Erwin 2013). The 
evolution of military intelligence seemed to have emerged since the Great War, with 
advancement moving so remarkably that the methods and technologies adopted during 
that period remained throughout the twentieth century. This advancement in technologies 
has seen the development of aerial reconnaissance, electronic deception and cryptography 
(Finnegan 2009), which is believed to have triggered the evolution of modern ISR. 
This collective term Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) was 
aptly coined by Admiral William Owens, the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
in the mid 1990s. During that period, integrated ISR was presented as an important 
component of military affairs revolution, defined by the information age and was 
implemented through the concept of net-centric warfare. Since the common usage in the 
1990s, there were many versions of the definition of the term. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines ISR as “an 
activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, 
processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and 
future operations.” The military dictionary also defines the individual terms as: 
“Intelligence–the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration 
evaluation, analysis and interpretation of available information;”, “Surveillance–the 
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 systematic observation of aerospace [air, space and cyberspace], surface, or subsurface 
areas, places or things, by visual, aural, electronic photographic or other means;” and 
“Reconnaissance–the mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other 
detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy.”. 
While the JP 1-02’s definition of the integrated ISR highlights the synergy 
interdependence of its individual components, Deptula and Brown (2008) suggest that 
ISR is more of an essential operational function. In today’s information age warfare, 
precision of engagement, and timeliness of critical information have evolved to a single, 
integrated process, interdependent with other operations of all the services and 
commands, and across all domains. ISR today makes up the vast majority of the 
operations required to achieve security objectives (Deptula and Brown 2008), providing 
the war fighter the required battlespace information. 
Consider the following scenario (extracted from Henderson 1993):  
The Cavalry platoon leader views the tactical situation on his 
reconnaissance/strike vehicle’s visual display. Along with his semi-
autonomous, robotic outrigger vehicles, he has Coalition Company. The 
green blip, two kilometers to his right, is a vehicle from his cavalry 
regiment. The blue symbol on his left is another vehicle from one of the 
allied armies in this combined operation. On this totally blacked out night, 
the mission is to reconnoiter and disable any forces found in the sector 
ahead and report back any reconnaissance over the real time video link to 
higher headquarters. A constant stream of intelligence information is 
pouring into each vehicle from headquarters, airborne intelligence 
platforms and satellite broadcasts. Only seconds to minutes old, the 
reconnaissance vehicle’s vetronics now displays red symbols behind the 
hills 4000 meters ahead. Automatic cross-correlation of data identifies the 
enemy as a squadron of tanks and supporting forces on the move, which 
must be destroyed. The highly automated targeting and weapon system on 
this two person vehicle has already computed firing parameters and will 
soon give a cue on the screen when the target is within the firing envelope. 
The tactical situation display in the airborne command post shows the 
same ground targets, as well as displaying the combined forces aircraft 
streaking to pounce on them in near real time. As the reconnaissance/strike 
vehicles fire their long range, millimeter wave, terminal homing rounds at 
the lead vehicles, the fighter pilots launch their long range stand-off attack 
weapons which will also guide themselves to their individual targets while 
the aircraft stay out of the range of defensive fire. Meanwhile, an airborne 
jamming aircraft hooked into the tactical situation net jams the enemy’s 
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 counter battery radar systems to mask the position of the 
reconnaissance/strike vehicles. Near real time weapons damage 
assessment collected and transmitted back from unmanned air vehicles 
and other sources simultaneously confirms to all parties that the enemy 
formation has been destroyed or disabled. 
This scenario, though futuristic, depicts the inherent link between intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance that clearly points towards situation awareness as the 
common thread. It has also saliently highlighted the importance of integrated systems in 
order to achieve highly-effective combat success. Highly-integrated systems enable 
timely collection, accurate correlation and processing of information, and at the same 
time generating coherent and holistic battlespace awareness to the war fighters and to the 
Force Commander. This allows the decision maker to successfully plan, operate and 
preserve forces, conserve resources and accomplish campaign objectives (Deptula and 
Brown 2008), thus achieving force protection and vehicles survivability. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Armored vehicles have long concerned themselves with balancing the iron 
triangle of protection, lethality, and mobility as part of force protection and vehicle 
survivability requirements. Unfortunately, threats increasing in severity and complexity, 
as well as the extensive use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Explosively-
Formed Penetrators and Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPG), have eluded the inadequacy 
of considering single vehicle enhancement to achieve overall system survivability. 
The Capstone project team Ground Combat Vehicle Survivability Robustness 
Analysis through Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE), uses MBSE to discover the 
system-level interconnections and relationships, to achieve integrated survivability of the 
armored vehicle(s), as part of a combined arms unit (Capstone Cohort 311-114G 2013). 
The four functions identified under the Capstone project are: (1) Avoid Penetration; (2) 
Provide Mobility; (3) Provide Lethality; and (4) Provide Situation Awareness. Although 
each of these categories possesses possibilities in impacting the overall survivability of 
the unit, the focus of this thesis will only be centered on the last type: Provide situation 
awareness. The objective of studying this category of survivability is how situation 
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 awareness can be achieved through the (effective) use of ISR systems, within the context 
of a traditional combat scenario. Achieving situational awareness, “the perception of 
elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of 
their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley 1995, 36), 
“has been recognized as a critical, yet often elusive, foundation for successful decision-
making across a broad range of complex and dynamic” (Rajant 2013, 1) environment 
such as the battlefield. Ensuring a high degree of situation awareness, while denying it to 
the enemy, has long been recognized as paramount, and involves more than just having 
more data than the enemy. It will require such data to be translated into the required 
intelligence in a timely and accurate manner, in order for effective decision to take place. 
Successful integration and employment of ISR enables comprehensive situation 
and battlespace awareness. This is the effect sought by national-security decision makers. 
The success of ISR lies with whether it is able to provide timely and accurate information 
for such decision making. In essence, intelligence provides improved battlespace 
awareness for decision makers, supported by surveillance, a sustained process not 
associated with specific target, and reconnaissance, designed to collect information 
against specific targets (Bosworth 2006). 
This thesis is approached using a Systems Engineering methodology to initially 
identify the area of interest, followed by defining the scope for the research. This thesis 
attempts to understand the underlying factors that influence the performance of any given 
ISR system and in addition, to explore the system architecture pertaining to integration of 
the ISR systems. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
While advanced technology and capabilities enable and create opportunities to 
realize holistic battlespace awareness, the biggest challenge remains to synchronize both 
effectiveness and capabilities of the ISR systems for the mission (Bosworth 2006). 
Situation awareness of the battlefield needs to be achieved through ISR, where its 
effectiveness is determined by its utility to decision superiority. The challenge is the main 
impetus of this thesis: Determining Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
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 system effectiveness and integration as part of force protection and system survivability 
by: (1) deriving the requirements and hence functions of ISR systems for a ground 
combat mission; (2) determining the parameters that will impact ISR system 
effectiveness; and (3) the integration of these systems by exploring the parameters 
identified. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This approach to this thesis is guided by the following questions: 
• What are the parameters that will impact ISR systems operational 
effectiveness in a ground combat mission, and how integration of these search 
systems can be achieved as part of force protection and system survivability? 
• What are the readily available technologies that can be used to support ISR 
requirements? 
• What are the requirements of such ISR systems in supporting such missions? 
• Are there existing integration policies or implementations in place in any of 
the Services? 
• What are the possible materiel or non-materiel approaches to improve ISR 
effectiveness and system integration (in particular cross-domain systems) for 
force protection and system survivability? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis is premised on achieving situation awareness by varying 
the parameters that impact the effectiveness of ISR systems. The focus is centered on 
Army ISR systems with the operational context referenced against that of a Combined 
Arms Unit (CAU). The overall results of this study will determine how situation 
awareness will in turn affect force protection and vehicle survivability of the unit. Figure 
1 shows the relationship between ISR, SA, and integrated survivability (force protection 
and vehicle survivability). This thesis provides a research extension to the Capstone 
project, which completes the holistic study approach on how the four functions identified 
earlier in this chapter impact the overall integrated survivability of the combine arms unit 
in the given scenario. 
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Figure 1.  Flow Model Relationship between ISR and Integrated Survivability 
E. APPROACH 
Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) is used in this thesis to provide the 
overall framework necessary for uncovering the system-level relationships of a given 
system. In this case, it is used to study the functional requirements of an ISR system, with 
the use of Vitech CORE®1. With it, the system architecture can be studied by 
decomposing it down to its system-functions level, and by mapping out its various 
interactions and relationships. Once that is identified, they are translated into parameters 
to be used in Map Aware Non-uniform Automata-Vector (MANA-V), an agent-based 
modeling software. MANA models the parameters according to the scenario(s) 
(missions) of the system, and helps to validate the assumptions made in the model and the 
impact on situation awareness and hence mission success of the given scenario. 
 
 
1 CORE is a comprehensive systems engineering and project management toolset designed for efficient 
management of complex systems engineering problems (Vitech CORE). 
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 F. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis is divided into nine phases as follows: 
• Discuss ISR Interoperability Architecture 
• Define the ISR system architecture 
• Identify ISR system capability needs 
• Identify the functions of the ISR system and translate them into system 
requirements 
• Translate the requirements into model-able parameters 
• Define the MOEs 
• Construct DOE using NOLH 
• Simulate the identified parameters using MANA-V 
• Analyze the results to identify the impact of the parameters on survivability 
according to the MOEs and scenario 
 7 
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 II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PREVIOUS WORK 
As mentioned in Chapter I, this thesis builds upon a recent Capstone project in 
Systems Engineering by studying the impact of situation awareness on ground combat 
unit survivability. The operational context of both this thesis and the Capstone project is 
shared by another thesis titled A Revolutionary Approach for the Development of Future 
Ground Combat System Specifications, by Major Tobias Treml. The prior thesis by Major 
Treml and the Capstone project, are briefly discussed to give the background context to 
the current thesis. 
1. Thesis–A Revolutionary Approach for the Development of Future 
Ground Combat System Specifications 
Normal project acquisition process is kick-started due to systems obsolescence 
issues, evolving threats, and/or identified capability gaps. Since the need for new systems 
is centered on such factors, systems acquisition teams and program managers often find 
themselves dealing with changing requirements that lead to changing system 
specifications. The task of determining correct specifications of a system becomes more 
challenging, especially in an ever-changing security climate amid technological 
advances. In addition, determining specifications of systems might be biased, especially 
after simulation runs were conducted to evaluate the system performance. The design 
trade-space might be skewed in order to achieve certain desired property, while 
sacrificing others. This inaccurate system specification or skewing of design trade-space 
leads to the failure of some delivered land combat systems that harness good potential in 
survivability (for example), but are unable to perform in the real world mission. As a 
result, a system is designed according to the identified threat(s) or capability gap at that 
certain point in time. In other words, the whole acquisition process is not holistic. 
Major Treml proposed looking from the perspective of Measure of Effectiveness 
(MOEs) as the main outcome in any acquisition project. By defining the MOEs of the 
given mission scenario and the desired performance (capabilities) of the new system, an 
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 un-biased conclusion can be drawn with respect to the system design. With such 
information, decision makers are able to visualize the trade-offs made between different 
factors and the defined MOEs, which will scope the specification process accordingly, 
hence improving the overall performance of (future) ground combat systems. 
By using MANA to model a realistic scenario, using a combined arms unit as the 
system for this simulation, variances in parameter changes, as well as the different 
configurations of parameters, are recorded and analyzed. This model forms the baseline 
model for both the Capstone project in determining effect of survivability and this current 
thesis in determining the effect of ISR on situation awareness, as part of survivability. 
2. Capstone Project–Ground Combat Vehicle Survivability Robustness 
Analysis through Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) 
Plagued with the need to balance the iron triangle of lethality, survivability, and 
mobility regarding vehicle designs of land combat systems, the Army often finds itself 
having to struggle with an optimal solution to the requirements. Whether it means more 
armor, hence compromising mobility, or having more mobility, which could also 
translate to enhanced survivability, such judgments are often made by subject-matter 
experts with limited, or non-existent, analytic metrics, that could be applied to support 
such design trade-offs with quantitative analysis. The Capstone project team Ground 
Combat Vehicle Survivability Robustness Analysis through Model-Based Systems 
Engineering (MBSE), discusses the conceptual methodology utilizing MBSE techniques 
to define such design trade space of a combat vehicle in the context of a combined arms 
unit, to uncover and understand the intricacy of the interactions within the system, with 
respect to integrated survivability (Capstone Cohort 311-114G 2013). 
The system identified by the team for the study is compared to the operational 
hierarchy of an actual Combined Arms Unit (CAU) that comprises a Mechanized Infantry 
Company Team, which is made up of a Mechanized Infantry Platoon and a Mechanized 
Platoon. The breakdown of the CAU organizational tasks displayed in Figure 2 is 
modeled after the actual combat CAU, which form the basis for combat simulation model 
for subsequent study of this thesis (Capstone Cohort 311-114G 2013). This Combined 
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 Arms Maneuver Company model comprises the Infantry Fighting Vehicle crews, Main 
Battle Tank crews and (Squads of a)2 Rifle Company of a (Mechanized) Infantry 
Battalion, supported by a Helicopter Platoon (Section), a Howitzer Battery (Battalion) 
and the Tactical UAV Platoon (Section). The sub-units highlighted in green were 
subsequently modeled as agents in MANA to study the impact they have on integrated 
survivability of the combat vehicle. 
  
Figure 2.  Organization Structure for Combined Arms Scenario (From Capstone Cohort 
311-114G 2013) 
The functional capabilities of a generic combat ground vehicle were investigated 
to provide the basis for the combined arms maneuver company’s functions required to 
accomplish the desired objectives. Identified as one of the main functional capabilities, 
the “Provide Survivability” function was further defined to highlight four areas of study 
2 The size and type of unit depicted in parenthesis is the actual representation of the real Combined 
Arms Unit. This differentiates the make-up between the actual and modeled Combined Arms Unit. 
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 (highlighted in green) that were subsequently evaluated using MANA with regard to 
vehicle survivability enhancement (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3.  Functional Hierarchy for the Combined Arms Company (From Capstone 
Cohort 311-114G 2013) 
These four sub-functions (1.4.4, 1.4.6, 1.4.7 and 1.4.8) were explored in the 
context of trade-space against three critical capabilities, namely: lethality, mobility, and 
situation awareness pertaining to survivability. The units identified earlier were used in 
the simulation analysis with respect to these critical capabilities in the trade-space 
defined. The results from the MANA simulation, together with Cost As Independent 
Variable (CAIV), and Overall Measures Of Effectiveness (OMOE) assessments, 
concluded that a materiel approach with improved detection systems (equipped with 
STARlite or GEN III FLIR) would yield the lowest cost with greatest enhancement to 
performance on survivability. 
B. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION 
Both the thesis and report have included situation awareness as one of the 
modeling parameters that impacts both ground combat system specifications and vehicle 
survivability, albeit not in detail. The Capstone project Ground Vehicle Survivability 
Robustness Analysis through Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) has indicated 
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 the possibility of survivability enhancement by increasing situation awareness 
capabilities in the CAU. In that study, the UAV was accorded a low probability of 
detection throughout the simulation, which has prevented the team from analyzing the 
impact of situation awareness on Force Exchange Ratios (FERs) and/or survivability. 
Despite that, the Capstone project has provided a good foundation for in-depth study into 
situation awareness, with a direct impact on the system survivability. Situation awareness 
enhances survivability by avoiding adversary detection and acquisition, achieved through 
effective and integrated ISR systems. 
Using the model created by Major Treml, and re-using the operation scenario and 
combat units, effects of ISR on situation awareness of the battle can be determined. This 
will in turn give an indication of how situation awareness impacts force protection and 
vehicle survivability through the effectiveness of ISR systems. 
In this thesis, effort is concentrated on the parameters that may impact ISR system 
effectiveness and integration, as part of force protection and system survivability (see 
Figure 4). Expanding on the Capstone team’s work, the function “Provide Situation 
Awareness” as part of survivability enhancement (circled in red in Figure 5) will be 
researched in greater detail. The combat units used in MANA simulation remained 
largely unchanged, with details elaborated further in Chapter V. 
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Figure 4.  Flow Model Relationship, Effects and MOEs of ISR on Situation Awareness 
 
 
Figure 5.  Functional Hierarchy for the Combined Arms Company (From Capstone 
Cohort 311-114G 2013) 
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 III. ISR INTEROPERABILITY FRAMEWORK 
A successful ISR Enterprise, comprising different aspects of information 
gathering with human and technical sources, enables the military echelons to achieve 
enhanced battlespace awareness that effectively meets the ground commander’s 
operational needs (Odierno 2008). The measure of success of such ISR campaign lies in 
the providence of accurate information at the right time for commanders to make sound 
tactical and operational decisions (Department of Defense 2007). Figure 6 depicts the 
ISR assets allocated to the respective echelon, from the Brigade Combat Teams up to the 
National level. 
 
Figure 6.  ISR Architecture (From Odierno 2008) 
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 Information sharing within the ISR happens on different organizational levels, 
and connecting systems responsible for gathering information and exploitation systems in 
a large environment, can be challenging (Essendorfer 2009). While it might seem a 
challenge to achieve common system interfaces across the ISR assets in such a complex 
environment, it is not impossible. Systems capable of handling distribution of data and 
fusion of collected intelligence are being introduced as solutions aim at creating common 
awareness critical in operations and missions. The integrated system consists of protocols 
that include operational concepts, architecture and interoperability framework, key 
interfaces and formats needed to integrate multiple (including legacy and future) ISR 
systems (NATO C3 Agency 2007). The following sections discuss: (1) ISR system 
integration architecture; and (2) deployment of the ISR architecture protocols by the 
various ISR communities and organizations. 
C. ISR SYSTEM INTEGRATION ARCHITECTURE 
The goal of integration is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
enterprise by having all the enterprise subsystems work together harmoniously. The 
integration goal includes the following (Giachetti 2010): 
• Improving information quality and timeliness, providing information upon 
demand and wherever required, regardless of the source system 
• Coordinating decisions from the different stakeholders, in working towards 
fulfilling the overall integration efforts, thus avoiding local optimization 
• Management of activities among people in the enterprise, synchronizing 
business processes in producing quality products and services 
This integration effort can be categorized into Organizational level and System 
Level (see Figure 7). The system-level integration looks at the infrastructure, information, 
and application tiers in which the system is able to achieve interoperability with the other 
systems to achieve a certain degree of integration. The organizational level will look at 
the processes and policies mandated by the agencies and parties involved, in order for 
system-level integration to work effectively. 
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Figure 7.  Enterprise Integration Architecture (After Giachetti 2010) 
The system level architecture can be further broken down into three basic tiers (as 
seen in Figure 8): 
• ISR system components – Sensors (technical systems and humans), 
Exploitation Systems and External Information Systems. Sensors are used to 
collect/gather required information on targets, and can be categorized into 
long-range, airborne, ground-based, and seaborne sensors. Exploitation 
systems are used to process and analyze the raw data collected from the 
sensors, sometimes together with human analysts. Information systems 
generate and display relevant processed data/information for situation 
awareness and general information sharing. 
• Data formats – Military standards STANAGs and Commercial Standards such 
as OpenGIS® Catalogue Service. The OpenGIS® Catalogue Service is 
defined by the OGC (Open GIS Consortium) as a standard for data 
dissemination that focuses on geospatial data, related services and resources. 
The selection of the standards is dependent on user need and domain 
requirements.  
• Database middleware such as COBRA for the client-server communication. It 
allows products to be defined and queryable, enable synchronization of 




Figure 8.  ISR System Integration Architecture (After Essendorfer 2009) 
The information or intelligence collected by the (proprietary) ISR sensor systems 
will be converted (by the converters) into the selected common data format. The 
standardized (raw) data once transferred over the network will be stored into a local data 
server. The same network is also connected to a suite of exploitation systems, where they 
are used to process and analyze the raw data, before the processed and filtered 
information is again transferred and stored in the same database server. Situation 
awareness systems will retrieve and generate the selected intelligence picture to support 
decision makers. 
The architecture set-up is scalable and can be modularized in the case of coalition 
operation. The sensor systems and server can be ‘sub-netted’ to be belonging to certain 
region or nation participating in the operation. In addition, the local database server can 
also be utilized to perform other tasks other than data storage, such as data fusion, data 
clarification/extraction and target recognition. Such architecture flexibility was exercised 
and implemented in several organizational levels, as discussed in the next section. 
 18 
 D. ISR ARCHITECTURE PROTOCOLS 
1. NATO Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Integration 
Architecture (NIIA) 
The NATO ISR Interoperability Architecture (NIIA) defines the overall structure 
of the elements of the ISR community across all levels of NATO and coalition 
operations, including war operations, peacekeeping, and peacemaking campaigns. It 
covers the standards developed by NATO Air Group IV3, as well as commercial and 
international standards applicable to ISR mission (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
2005). Covering both IMINT and now SIGINT (ELINT reporting format only), the 
architecture seeks to achieve data interoperability between the NATO assets at Degree 2–
Structured Data Exchange, involving human-interpretable structured data intended for 
manual and/or automated handling, but requires manual compilation, receipt, and/or 
message dispatch. The architecture focuses on the ISR interfaces between airborne and 
surface-based elements, and between the outputs of the surface-based elements. This 
electronic interoperability is achieved via the development of NATO Standardization 
Agreements or STANAGs. These STANAGs define the processes, procedures and 
conditions for interoperable interface to the equipment from the members of the alliance, 
without altering the internal architecture of the individual system architecture. Some of 







3 The NATO Air Force Armaments Group (NAFAG) is one of the three Main Armament Groups 
subordinate to the Conference of National Armaments Director (CNAD). Through its subordinate Level 2 
Groups and Working Groups NAFAG is responsible for promoting multinational co-operation and 
standardization in the area of aerospace armaments via joint activities and information exchange. 
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 STANAG Description 
STANAG 3377 Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Report Forms 
STANAG 4545 NATO Secondary Image Format (NSIF) 
STANAG 4559 NATO Standard Imagery Library Interface (NSILI) 
STANAG 4575 NATO Advanced Data Storage Interface (NADSI) 
STANAG 4586 Standard Interfaces of UAV Control System (UCS) for NATO 
UAV Interoperability 
STANAG 4607 NATO Ground Moving Target Indicator Format (GMTIF) 
STANAG 4609 NATO Digital Motion Imagery Standard 
STANAG 4633 NATO Common ELINT Reporting Format 
STANAG 5500 NATO Message Text Formatting System (FORMETS) 
STANAG 7023 NATO Primary Image Format (NPIF) 
STANAG 7024 Air Reconnaissance Tape Recorder Standard 
STANAG 7085 Interoperable Data Links for Imaging Systems 
Table 1.   List of NATO STANAGs 
The NIIA facilitates some degree of interoperability among the subordinate 
architectures that may be required to interoperate with the ISR architecture in theatre 
wide operations. As more intelligence sources are included into the architecture, together 
with advances in technology and concept of operations, the architecture becomes more 
complex and complete at the same time. While currently the NIIA only comprises 
formats for SIGINT and IMINT, it will grow over time to include also other forms of 
intelligence, as shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.  Envisaged NIIA as the Overarching ISR Architecture (From North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization 2005) 
These NATO standards are mapped into the International Standards Organization 
(ISO) 7-Layer Interface Model, to reflect how they can work in-conjunction with 
commercial and international standards, while at the same time identifying the gaps for 
future implementation (see Figures 10 and 11), that show how the NATO STANAGs 
works in ISR system interfaces, and their relationship with ISO 7-Layer Interface Model. 
Despite the fact that such architectures were developed to allow access to shared 
intelligence among the NATO members in coalition operations, it is significant to note 
that they are also applicable to non-NATO coalition operations. In fact, the NIIA 
framework can even be extended to other ISR missions, since the assets and the 
operations conducted are essentially the same. 
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Figure 10.  NATO ISR System Interfaces (From North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
2005) 
 
Figure 11.  ISO 7-Layer Model Mapping of ISR Interfaces (From North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization 2005) 
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 2. Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition 
(MAJIC) 
The MAJIC is a multi-national effort to enable interoperability between NATO 
and national ISR and C2 systems through the use of common interfaces for data formats 
and exchange mechanisms. Working with nine nations4 under a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU), its aim is to improve commander’s situation awareness by 
developing and evaluating operational and technical means for ISR assets interoperability 
in the coalition environment. MAJIC has since created an interface based on STANAG 
4559 (NATO Standard ISR Library Interface) for metadata-based access to archive data 
from any Coalition Shared Database (CSD) in the MAJIC environments. With the 
development of the CSD and CONOPs for coalition ISR operations, the MAJIC also 
provides a means for the DoD, intelligence and coalition communities to assess new ISR 
net-centric data sharing concepts and solutions (NATO C3 Agency 2010). 
 
Figure 12.  Coalition Network Environment (From (NATO C3 Agency 2010) 
4 The nine nations are namely Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, United 
Kingdom and the United States of America. 
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 3. DoD Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS) 
Within the DoD, a Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS) 
program was established in 1996 as a strategy to achieve interoperable systems and an 
initiative to guide interrelated service and DoD agency programs in achieving 
interoperable multi-ISR processing and exploitation capability. In essence, it is an ISR 
system that processes and exploits U.S. and selected coalition sensor data (Army, Navy, 
Airforce, Marine Corps, USSOCOM) (Martin 2009). It generates consumable 
intelligence within the ISR Enterprise and is part of the evolution to being net-centric 
capable. Under this framework, each Service’s fielded ISR capabilities will be 
interoperable with the Joint ISR architecture, despite the Services’ differences in 
requirements of getting data distributed at the tactical level (Ground and Surface 
Systems) (Martin 2009). Similar to the NATO and MAJIC, the DCGS has common 
elements such as hardware components, standards, applications, joint documentation and 
governance structure to facilitate interoperability (Martin 2009). These points of 
interoperability allow each Service’s FoS to share information outside of the DoD DCGS 
network, without having to be connected to the services outside of it. This is achievable 
by mandating that the Service’s FoS be interoperable with the pre-defined core set of 
platforms and sensors (Corsano 2003). 
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Figure 13.  DoD DCGS Concept (From Joint Requirements Oversight Council 2003) 
The DoD DCGS program currently comprises a DCGS Integration Backbone, the 
Block 10.2 Multi-INT Core developed by the Airforce and the DCGS-A, the Army’s 
single integrated ISR ground processing systems (Airforce Programs 2004). The Block 
10.2 is part of the Airforce’s initiation to improve its DCGS capability and to achieve a 
multi-INT, distributed exploitation capability. 
The DCGS Integration Backbone is both a software architectural framework and a 
developer’s toolkit. It provides the tools, standards, architecture and documentation for 
the DCGS community to achieve a multi-INT, network centric environment with the 
interoperability and flexibility of access to information for mission execution (Corsano 
2003). As seen in Figure 14, it comprises a Repository Layer, a Service Layer and a 
Viewer Layer that facilitate scalability and backward compatibility to legacy systems, as 
well as an integrated information management process that employs metadata tags for 
data association (Corsano 2003). 
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Figure 14.  DCGS Integrated Backbone Layers (DIB, DTIC.mil) 
The deployment of the ISR interoperability architecture and framework discussed 
thus far (NIIA, MAJIC and DoD DCGS) has provided good insights to some of the 
technical implementation measures, on top of operational concepts to achieve systems 
interoperability. The NIIA implements common interface standards or STANAGs across 
the NATO nation systems; MAJIC implements a common shared database (CSD) for 
members of the coalition force, while the DoD mandates a common integration backbone 
that binds the Service’s FoS. Depending on the level of integration or interoperability 
framework desired, the ISR architecture is selected and implemented accordingly to 
mission and organizational needs. 
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 III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
A. ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE AND RELIANCE ON ISR 
Following the DoD’s guidance to increase networking and interoperability within 
and between the Services, the respective Service’s DCGS were developed, and in 
particular for the Army, the establishment of three DCGS-A Blocks under the DCGS 
program: fixed, mobile and embedded. The change in the future force structure of the 
Army reduces it from a large heavily armored force to a much smaller and more 
maneuverable lighter force5. This implies an increased demand on battlespace situation 
awareness, achieveable with ISR systems that encompass multi-INT sensor capability, 
having powerful correlation/fusion algorithm of multiple sensor data to produce an 
integrated situation picture that facilitates real-time sensor-to-shooter decision processes, 
and supports timely battle engagements. Extracted from the Objective Force in 2015 
White Paper, the change in force structure leading to greater dependence on ISR assets 
can be seen in the Army’s Operational Concept, based on the following seven principles: 
• Net-centric, knowledge based 
• Manned and unmanned ground-air systems 
• Integrated, fused multi-INT and non-multi-INT sensors 
• Multi-skilled, adaptive soldiers and civilians 
• Assured access to and interdependent with Joint and National Intelligence 
systems 
• Robust reach and project 
• Visualization at the point of decision 
The Army’s reliance on the ISR systems and the dependence on information 
operations are evident. In fact, as technology advances and evolve, a successful battle of 
the future is one that allows fluid allocation and reallocation of ISR systems based on 
5 The Objective Force in 2015 White Paper has revealed the future Army to be a hybrid capability 
fighting force, comprising five Units of Employment (UE), 15 units of Action (UA), six Stryker Brigade 
Combat Teams (SBCTs), two 1/3 Digital Division Corps, and a combination of heavy, light and specialty 
forces brigades (airborne, air assault, Special Forces), USAR units and four Multi-Functional ARNG 
Divisions (Riggs 2002). While this approach has evolved, it is useful to explore its emphasis on ISR for 
survivability and force protection. 
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 capabilities and intelligence needs during the different phases of the battle, and no longer 
depends on the Services that “own” them nor the platform they are mounted on. Using 
the net-centric environment framework (Figure 15), the relation between ISR systems and 
unit survivability can be mapped accordingly (Figure 16): 
 
Figure 15.  Net-Centric Environment (NEC) (From Zavin n.d.) 
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Figure 16.  Impact of ISR parameters on Unit Survivability 
Discussion in the subsequent sections and chapters will be centered on one slice 
of the combat unit within the Army. By analyzing the unit’s ISR systems, the study will 
determine the impact of these organic ISR systems on the outcome of the battle, and the 
overall survivability of the unit. This result based on one slice within the Army can 
subsequently be promulgated to a level higher or even extend to a larger slice within the 
Army or other Service, to study the impact of a larger integrated ISR systems within 
another similar set-up. 
B. GROUND COMBINED ARMS UNIT 
The system of interest here is modeled after the actual Combined Arms Unit 
(CAU). The combat model of the Combined Arms Maneuver Company comprises the 
Infantry Fighting Vehicle crews, Main Battle Tank crews and Rifle Company of an 
Infantry Battalion, supported by a Helicopter Platoon, a Howitzer Battery and the 
Tactical UAV Platoon. (see Figure 17, units highlighted in green). The respective sub-
units are further broken down to the component levels, highlighting the specific 
weaponry and combat vehicles forming the sensors under the ISR domain. 
 29 
  
Figure 17.   Organization Structure for Combined Arms Scenario (from Capstone Cohort 
311-114G 2013) 
Since the focus of this thesis is studying the impact of ISR systems on the 
situation awareness of the battle and hence unit survivability, sensors that provide critical 
real-time intelligence are of special interest. As such, the study will not consider the 
helicopter platoon and howitzer battalion by nature of their CONOPS, where they are 
more likely to act upon the intelligence received rather than actively hunting for it. The 
following units are hence singled out for further analysis into their ISR system functions: 
• The land combat vehicle system 
• Main Battle Tank (Abrams M1A2) – The M1 Abrams main battle tank has the 
ability to close with and destroy enemy forces on the integrated battlefield using 
mobility, firepower and shock effect. The M1A2 is a modernization program that 
includes a commander’s independent thermal viewer, an improved commander’s 
weapon station, position navigation system, a distributed data and power 
architecture and an embedded diagnostic system and improved fire control 
systems (Army Military Features n.d.). New features also include “second 
generation thermal imaging gunner’s sight with increased range; driver’s 
integrated display and thermal management system, and a digital data bus and 
radio interface unit providing a common picture among the M1A2s on the 
battlefield” (The Armor Site 2012, 1). 
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Figure 18.  M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank (From The Armor Site 2012) 
• Infantry Fighting Vehicle (Bradley M2A3) – The Bradley fighting vehicle is 
designed for the mobility; it also protects infantry troops when transporting them 
to critical battlefield areas (Military Analysis Network 2000). Equipped with a 
digitized on-board subsystem, and an Army Technical Architecture (ATA) 
compliant C2 software suite allow the mechanized infantry units to share 
battlefield information with the rest of the M1A2 SEP-equipped6 armor units 
(Military Analysis Network 2000). This digitization upgrade enhances situational 
awareness and survivability by automating the fault reporting, diagnostics and 
crew functions. The improved Bradley is also equipped with an array of sensors 
such as an Improved Bradley acquisition system (IBAS), commander's 
independent viewer (CIV), and a GPS enabled position navigation system for 
enhanced target acquisition and engagement, and situation awareness. 
6 The M1A2 System Enhancement Package (SEP) was an improvement of the M1A1 with 
commander’s independent thermal viewer, weapon station, position navigation equipment and a full set of 
controls and displays linked by a digital data bus. The M1A2 SEP added digital maps, Force XXI Battle 
Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) capabilities. 
 31 
                                                 
  
Figure 19.  Bradley Infantry Vehicle (From Military Analysis Network 2000) 
• Tactical Aerial Unmanned Vehicle (TAUV) – The RQ-11 Raven is a lightweight 
unmanned aircraft system designed for rapid deployment and high mobility. Capable 
of producing live-coverage videos for soldiers to get real-time, up-to-date and over-
the-horizon views in area of interest, it has a flight endurance of 60 to 90mins (using 
rechargeable battery) and an effective operational radius of about 10km (6.2miles). 
This UAV has a flying speed of 32km/h to 81km/h at an operating altitude between 
30m and 152m (Army-Technology.com 2012). 
 
Figure 20.  RQ-11 Raven UAV (From Aero Vironment 2013) 
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 • The Bradley Infantry Soldiers – Assumed to be similarly equipped as the Cavalry 
scouts such as the armored HMMWVs, the Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance 
System (LRAS3) enables the soldiers to be able to quickly locate enemy attack forces 
and relay the information back to tanks. 
C. CAPABILITY NEEDS 
Combined Arms uses the capabilities of each warfighting function and 
information in complementary and reinforcing capabilities. It multiplies Army forces’ 
effectiveness, and is a success formula involving both highly trained soldiers and 
integrated information systems (Department of the Army 2012). The criticality of the 
integrated systems in fulfilling the generation of near real-time information on areas of 
interest, objects and people as part of battlespace awareness depends on the capability 
needs described as follows: 
• Timeliness – The ability to present information and data at the required, appropriate 
time. Timely intelligence has a huge impact on the commander’s decision-making 
ability. It enables the commander to react responsively to situations, creating 
confusion and disorder in the adversary, thereby gaining an upper hand over the 
enemy. Timeliness is key to creating strike initiative and leverage in a battle. 
• Accuracy – The fidelity of obtained information with respect to actual enemy activity. 
This is a powerful force enhancer where military planning and execution can proceed 
with confidence, and is a necessary condition for victory (Payton 1993). 
• Persistent Surveillance – The persistence from ISR systems allows commanders and 
decision makers to monitor activities on a constant basis and determine a pattern of 
life. This enables better planning and the ability to respond in an effective manner 
(Bosworth n.d.). 
D. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
The key design considerations and implementation of the ISR systems, critical in 
meeting the capability needs, are captured in Table 2. They formed the variables that will 
be modeled in determining the impact on situation awareness of the combined arms unit 





 Capability Needs Implemented by 
Timeliness • Latency of information dissemination systems 
Accuracy • Outgoing communication links 
• Sensors detection capability 
Persistence • Endurance of UAV 
• Number of UAVs 
Table 2.   Capability Needs and System Requirements 
E. MISSION 
A well integrated ISR system platform enhances battlespace awareness and 
facilitates decision making. Especially so in a land campaign where range is usually 
limited, ISR systems provide substantial intelligence of the battlefield over what could be 
achieved from a single sensor system. As such, the deployment of ISR systems in a 
combined arms set-up aims to achieve comprehensive and holistic situation awareness, 
hence providing force protection and system survivability. 
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 F. OPERATIONAL VIEW (OV) – 1 
 
Figure 21.  OV-1 of the Combined Arms Unit 
The operational view depicts the interaction that take place between the BLUE 
force (ISR systems in place) and the RED force during the battle. The bolts in white 
represent the communication links between the ISR systems and the CAU HQ. This form 
of communication is two-way, where the intelligence from the troops and vehicles will be 
updated to the HQ command center. Similarly, intelligence of interest to any particular 
units will be sent from the HQ to the unit. The process will take place throughout the 
conduct of the battle. The red lines indicate the interaction between the forces (detection 
of enemies). Of note here is that the Bradley dismounted troops are only able to send 
intelligence information back to their vehicles and not to the CAU HQ direct. 
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 G. CONTEXT DIAGRAM 
The context diagram for this system is reflected in Figure 22. The interactions 
between the RED force, ISR systems (BLUE force) and the CAU HQ shown in OV-1 are 
shown to identify the specific parameters affecting information transfer, which could 
impact the overall unit situation awareness. These parameters are studied via simulation 
as part of this thesis. 
 
Figure 22.  Context Diagram of the CAU ISR Systems 
H. QUALITY FUNCTION DEPLOYMENT (QFD) 
With capability needs and system parameters identified, what is required now is 
the mapping of the needs to the parameters, against the sub-systems in the CAU. The 
mapping reveals the parameters to be modeled under those specific sub-components. The 
Quality Function Deployment (QFD) is one method used to facilitate the translation of a 
set of subjective requirements into a set of system-level requirements (Blanchard 2011). 
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 The translation is shown in the matrix form in Table 3. This QFD table shows traceability 
of the modeled parameters and their potential impact on mission effectiveness of the 
combined arms unit. 
Capability Needs of ISR Timeliness Persistence





Infantry Soldiers X X
Bradley Infantry Soldiers X X
Bradley M2A3 X X X
Abrams M1A2 X X X





Table 3.   QFD for ISR Capability Needs 
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 IV. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
The study uses Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) experimental design 
to examine all possible combinations of the parameters identified in the QFD in Table 3.  
These parameters are subsequently refined into “variants” during results analysis for 
better understanding of their impact on situation awareness, which contributes to the 
overall unit operational effectiveness and survivability of the troops and vehicles. 
A. VARIANTS 
The parameters identified to have impact on ISR system effectiveness and 
integration are grouped accordingly into two variants: Sensor effectiveness variant, and 
the Common Operating Picture (COP) variant (Horn 2002). The sensor effectiveness 
variant looks at performance of sensors in generating information advantage for the 
BLUE force. As such, system parameters affecting ISR sensor accuracy in identifying 
and engaging the adversary are studied under this variant. The COP variant is used to 
simulate the effects of sensors integration and the overall changes in situation awareness 
of the combined arms unit. Here, system parameters affecting the timing and building up 
of information or situation picture are studied under this variant. 
1. Sensor Effectiveness 
Two sensor functionalities are identified under this variant – sensor detection and 
classification accuracy and outgoing communication links accuracy. These functionalities 
are used as surrogates for full sensor capability of the ISR systems, since they are 
modifiable in MANA. Enhancing sensor capability should have a positive impact on the 
ISR systems, hence improving the COP, situation awareness and overall Force Exchange 
Ratio (FER) of the unit (Horn 2002). 
This variant is examined across a range of values defined for the simulation. The 
response behavior of the simulation is investigated to determine the level where COP is 
enhanced, as well as where further enhancement on sensors effectiveness no longer has 
an improved effect on overall unit survivability. 
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 2. Common Operational Picture (COP) 
The COP variant is used to study the outcome of sensor integration and the 
overall changes in situation awareness by manipulating the timeliness and persistence 
involved in building up the operational picture. The three functionalities identified are 
persistence of UAV, the number of UAVs and latency of information. The persistence of 
the UAV determines the flow of the information being updated to the COP; the number 
of UAVs implies the extent of coverage and hence the comprehensiveness of the COP. 
Lastly, the latency of information from the various sensors determines the timeliness and 
criticality of intelligence flow that impacts the mission effectiveness. 
The value of ISR system integration is explored using this variant because the 
output of the disparate sensors can only be collated or fused to form a common situation 
picture when there is (effective) integration in place. The parameters to be examined 
under this variant are evaluated at the predefined ranges. The detailed discussion of the 
variables at the different levels takes place at a later section. 
B. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT 
Design of Experiment (DOE) is a tool used for selecting the set of parameters by 
which an experiment is being performed, by controlling the trade space for the levels of 
factors. By considering all the variables simultaneously and making deliberate changes or 
modifications to them, the effects on the response over a wide range of values can be 
measured. This multivariable testing overcomes traditional experimental method by 
eliminating the inefficiency and inability in determining the effects that are caused by 
several factors in combination, therefore allowing a causal predictive model to be 
determined (Telford 2007). 
A design matrix is constructed with every column corresponding to a factor to be 
investigated and each row representing a design point. Five fundamental principles are 
applied in DOE when constructing such a matrix, thus improving the efficiency of 
experiments (Telford 2007). These principles by Telford 2007 are briefly described 
below: 
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 • Randomization – Protects against results distortion due to an unknown bias. 
An example of bias could be an instrumental drift used to compare a baseline 
procedure to a modified one. This can be eliminated by randomizing the 
testing order to average out the bias. 
• Replications – Increases sample size and is one of the methods to increase 
precision of the experiment. It increases the signal-to-noise ratio by 
eliminating the noise from the uncontrolled nuisance variable. 
• Blocking – Another method for increasing precision by removing the effect of 
known nuisance factors. However, blocking is a restriction of complete 
randomization since both the baseline and modification procedures are applied 
to the same block of design or experiment. In this way, batch-to-batch 
variability is removed from the “experimental error”, hence improving 
precision. 
• Orthogonality – Results in factor effects being uncorrelated and hence more 
easily interpreted, since they are varied independently of one another. The 
main results can be computed by taking the differences of averages. 
• Factorial experimentation – The effects due to each factor and to the 
combinations of the factors are estimated. Factorial designs are constructed 
geometrically and factors are varied simultaneously and orthogonally. They 
can be full or fractional depending on whether the data are collected from all 
of the vertices of a cube or from specific subsets of all possible vertices. These 
designs increase precision because of the built-in internal replication. The 
difference in factorial experimentation is shown in Figure 23 below: 
 
Figure 23.  Full Factorial and One-Half Factorial in Three Dimensions (From Telford 
2007) 
Two types of commonly used design under Factorial Designs are namely 2k 
Factorial Design (Coarse Grids) and mk Factorial Design (Finer Grids). 2k factorial 
designs sample at the vertices of a hypercube defined by the factors’ low and high 
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 settings, whereas the mk factorial designs reveal more factors interactions by sampling 
more of the spaces within the cube, which is otherwise known as having better space-
filling properties. Despite the greater detail provided by the factorial designs, they are not 
good experimental designs due to massive data requirements (Sanchez 2005). As such, 
smarter and more efficient types of experimental designs is desired to achieve the end 
results of exploring the interactions among the factors of interest, yet keeping the 
experimental design simple. 
Latin Hypercube (LH) is one design which offers flexibility of constructing 
efficient designs for quantitative factors, exhibiting some of the space-filling properties of 
factorial designs yet requiring orders of magnitude less sampling. Figure 24 shows the 
comparison on the degree of factor interactions between 2k, mk factorial designs and Latin 
Hypercube. 
 
Figure 24.  Degree of Factors Interactions between the 22, 112 and Random LH Designs 
(After Sanchez 2005). 
C. NEARLY ORTHOGONAL LATIN HYPERCUBE (NOLH) 
Latin hypercubes are good general-purpose designs for exploring complex 
simulation models when there is insufficient knowledge about the response surface 
(Sanchez 2005). Unlike the 22 factorial design where there is limited information in the 
center of the cube, and without the overwhelming details from the 112 factorial design, 
LH provides substantially accurate results at just a fraction of the sampling cost (N = 11 
vs N = 121 of the 112 factorial design) (Sanchez 2005). In order to overcome the high 
pairwise correlation that exist for small LH designs where N is smaller than k, Cioppa and 
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 Lucas 2005 developed tables that allow the so-called Nearly Orthogonal Linar Hypercube 
(NOLH) designs to exhibit good space-filling and orthogonality properties, even for 
small and moderate k, as shown in Table 4.  
 
Table 4.   Data Requirements for NOLH (From Sanchez 2005) 
Correspondingly, the space-filling property of the NOLH compares favorably 
with that of factorial design, and allows dramatically lesser design points to be 
investigated (see Figure 25). 
 
 
Figure 25.  Scatterplot Matrix for a 54 Factorial Design (left) compared to a NOLH 
Design (right) with same four factors in 17 runs (After Sanchez 2005) 
NOLH is used in this thesis to investigate the interactions between the identified 
ISR system parameters on the impact of unit survivability. The measurable outcome of 
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 the simulation Force Exchange Ratio (FER) will be determined for each run of the design 
points generated based on the desired number of factors. The FER will give an indication 
of unit survivability and the corresponding factors influencing it. 
D. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND SCENARIO 
The operational scenario is extracted from Major Treml’s thesis, referenced 
against a division-level TRADOC scenario known as the Multi-Level Scenario MLS1.0 
(Brown et al. 2009). The specific scenario used for the simulation refers to Phase II of the 
operation–International Border restoration. It shows the attack of a reinforced 
mechanized infantry company of the 7 HBCT (Heavy Brigade Combat Team) against 
parts of a mechanized battalion based on a fictitious scenario taking place in Colorado, 
United States. Figure 26 shows the tactical overview of the scenario. 
 
Figure 26.  Division Level CONOPS of the chosen TRADOC Scenario (From Brown et 
al. 2009) 
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 This scenario is chosen to illustrate a realistic battlefield environment that depicts 
a full spectrum of warfare. The diverse force structure of the scenario models closely the 
actual doctrine of a combined arms unit, with the most advantaged major ground vehicles 
and joint combat arms systems operationally deployed. 
1. BLUE Force Concept of Operation 
The mission of the BLUE force is to secure Objective 1, as a precursor for an 
attack by the Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) against Objective HAWK, as part of the 
overall main effort towards border restoration. Quoted from Capstone 2013, the BLUE 
force is attacking along a major highway 30km south towards Objective 1. With the 
BLUE force (comprising one mechanized platoon, one tank platoon) as the point 
company, it is the Battalion’s main effort in securing the area and hence has task priority 
over indirect fire support from 155mm howitzer as well as priority on one medium UAV 
from the Battalion’s UAV assets for intelligence gathering while enroute to the objective. 
The operational plan is shown in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27.  BLUE Force Operational Plan From (Treml 2013) 
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 2. RED Force Concept of Operation 
The mission of the RED force is to deter and destroy the BLUE force from their 
fortified and concealed position with IEDs and mines. Its concept of operation is divided 
into three phases: ambush, hit and run and the main battle. Figure 28 shows the RED 
defense plan. The phases of the battle are described as follows: 
 
Figure 28.  RED Force Defense Plan (From Treml 2013) 
Phase I: Ambush – A form of attack by fire or other destructive means from 
concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy (Department of the Army 
2001). In this scenario, the enemy does not have the firepower to defeat the BLUE force, 
due to BLUE having firepower superiority. Hence the aim of the ambush is to inflict 
casualties on the BLUE force as much as they can. The RED force is assumed to conceal 
very well despite the open terrain, while the BLUE force advances towards their 
objective with their main battle tanks first. 
Phase II: Hit and run – This phase of battle entails engagement of long-range, 
precision attack of two RED MILAN anti-tank systems on the BLUE force. In 
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 continuation of Phase I, this is done to inflict more damages to the BLUE force and at the 
same time to create a psychological effect on the BLUE’s morale. 
Phase III: The Main Battle – This phase contains the main action. The RED fights 
from prepared, concealed positions with heavy mortars providing indirect fire support 
and their T90M tanks cutting the lines of advancement of the BLUE. Both the RED and 
the BLUE have complete lines of communication to their company headquarters and 
have access to continuous and updated common situation picture. 
The simulation is modeled according to the three phases described in the RED 
defense plan. Such an approach is taken to simulate the different fighting tactics involved 
in a full spectrum of war all within one scenario, so as to eliminate the need to generate a 
variety of scenarios across the same set of parameters change. This keeps the DOE 
relatively simple and neat, since the intent of the simulation is to analyze the influence of 
system parameters change on the defined MOEs. 
The main battle phase is the focus of the simulation, as it is usually the most 
critical phase of any battle. The BLUE force has suffered attrition during the first two 
phases of the battle and hence the real available forces and assets remaining during the 
main battle are crucial to the fight. During this phase, the sensors are deployed full force 
in providing critical intelligence updates to the ground troops. The capability of the ISR 
sensors will have a significant impact on the outcome of the battle and such outcome is 
often readily felt and will tilt the scale of the whole battle. 
E. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) is defined as “operational measures of success 
that are closely related to the achievement of mission or operational objectives; i.e. they 
provide insight into the accomplishment of the mission needs, independent of the chosen 
solution.” (Roedler 2005). Effectiveness measures are mission and scenario dependent, 
and hence for this chosen scenario, the operational goal of the ISR system is to provide 
enhanced situation awareness that leads to improved performance. Since mission 
performace involves friendly forces defeating enemy forces in ground combat, the 
primary MOE for this study is the Force Exchange Ratio (FER), which is considered to 
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 be the best measure for simple attrition analysis (Horn 2002). For this thesis, it is defined 
as the ratio of percentage RED loss to percentage BLUE loss, and therefore ratios greater 
than 1.0 implies a situation favorable for the BLUE. The formula for the FER can be 





=  (1) 
Enhanced sensor capabilities and system integration should have a positive impact 
on the MOE (high FER). This implies well-integrated ISR systems are in place, and 
hence a well-networked environment. This allows battlefield information to reach the 
ground units and command HQ efficiently, which is critical especially during the main 
battle phase, where the fight and firepower is mainly concentrated. 
F. BASELINE MODEL 
This thesis uses the baseline model, developed by Major Treml, as a starting point 
for subsequent parameter modification to suit the objectives of this study. Parameter 
change relating to ISR systems is introduced to determine the impact on situation 
awareness of the battlefield. The following tables show the agents make-up of the 
baseline model, designed by Major Treml, to achieve a 30%-50% BLUE loss while 
achieving some RED victories. The types of agents remained unchanged throughout the 
simulation and the quantity reflected in the tables serves as the start state for the 
simulation study. The figures are expected to change once the simulation starts to run 
from Phase I through to Phase III of the battle. 
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Table 5.   BLUE Force Composition (From Treml 2013) 
 
Table 6.   RED Force Composition (From Treml 2013) 
In MANA modeling language, the same type of agents can be grouped into 
different squads of a given properties. For the purpose of this study, the properties of the 
agents under the various squads remain largely unchanged from the baseline model, less 
those agents highlighted in red in Table 5. These BLUE agents form up the ISR system in 
the combined arms unit, and are therefore the study interest of this thesis. 
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 G. THESIS MODEL AND PARAMETERS 
1. ISR System Requirements 
Highlighted earlier in Chapter IV, a well-integrated ISR system enhances 
battlespace awareness and facilitates decision making. The capability requirements of the 
ISR sensor platforms need to be (1) timely in intelligence acquisition, (2) accurate in 
information processing and (3) persistent in monitoring activities (see Table 7), to 
achieve comprehensive and holistic situation picture of the battlefield, hence providing 
force protection and system survivability. 
 
Table 7.   Aggregation of Parameters 
Table 7 shows the specific units in the CAU being aggregated into a higher level 
for simulation purpose. Units similar in nature are grouped under the same category, as 
“Infantry” and “Armored Vehicles”. This helps to simplify the model by implementing 
the same degree of change between the different tanks within the same category. A range 
of values (minimum and maximum) is assigned for each design point generated using 
NOLH design. Table 8 shows the design factors with their respective ranges of values, 
representative of the sensor capabilities that are modifiable under MANA’s squad 
properties. The threshold values are referenced from literature and a brief description of 
the parameters is provided below. 
 50 
 Index Variable Name Metric Minimum Value Maximum Value Modification in MANA
1 # of UAV Quantity 1 5 # of agent
2 Data Latency of Infantry Time (s) 10 120
inter squad latency under the 
outbound comms link
3 Data Latency of Ground (Armored) Vehicles Time (s) 1 20
inter squad latency under the 
outbound comms link
4 Data Latency of UAV Time(s) 1 8
inter squad latency under the 
outbound comms link
5 Persistency of UAV* Fuel Endurance (mins) 60 110 fuel endurance of UAV
6 Outgoing Comms Accuracy Infantry % 85 100 outbound comms link of Infantry
7 Outgoing Comms Accuracy Ground % 85 100 outbound comms link of ground
8 Outgoing Comms Accuracy UAV % 85 100 outbound comms link of UAV
9 Sensors Accuracy Ground % 85 100 Sensor accuracy
10 Sensors Accuracy UAV % 85 100 Sensor accuracy  
Table 8.   Design Factors and Threshold Values 
Number of UAV–This factor determines the amount of information that can be 
collected as well as the coverage over the battlefield. Based on current doctrine, each 
Battalion has an organic asset of two UAVs, that can be flown singly or both at the same 
time depending on operational requirements and operation tempo. The study intends to 
determine whether by doubling the number of UAVs, the building of situation picture of 
the battlespace is more comprehensive due to larger coverage and longer persistence. In 
addition, the results can also determine the point where subsequent increase in the asset 
no longer has an impact on the overall value of intelligence required. 
Data Latency of Infantry and Ground (Armored) Vehicles–This factor determines 
the time delay between collected and disseminated intelligence of the ground troops and 
the armored vehicles. Both are designed with different time latency due to the nature of 
the equipment that they are assigned. Infantry troops are usually equipped with just laser 
rangefinder or binoculars, and as such, once they spotted enemy related information, they 
will report back to HQ via their communication set. Time latency sets in between them 
spotting the enemy and the actual reporting due to ground constraint, such as finding a 
concealed area before reporting back to HQ. For the armored vehicles, since most of the 
tanks now are now equipped with a digital electronic architecture that incorporates an on-
board subsystem monitoring, diagnostics/prognostics, and an Army Technical 
Architecture (ATA) compliant Command and Control software suite, the tank 
commanders are able to disseminate intelligence faster than the troops, if not real-time. 
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 Data Latency of UAV–This factor determines the time delay between collected 
and disseminated intelligence of the UAV. While based on literature, the sensor latency 
can go to as low as 40ms, this simulation will arbitrarily fixed the latency from from 1 to 
8s to model the impact of delay. In Major Treml’s thesis, he used 300s as input latency 
for the UAV to illustrate the delay in information dissemination between the Battalion 
HQ and CAU HQ. The 300s latency involved data processing and information 
dissemination from the Battalion HQ down to the troops. For the purpose of this thesis, 
this man-in-the-loop processing loop is not considered; rather the study focuses on the 
delay in information dissemination from UAV to the Battalion HQ (the sensor loop only). 
The assumption made is that there is no latency between Battalion HQ and Company 
troops who need the information collected by UAV. 
Persistence of UAV–This factor acts as a surrogate to the overall ISR system 
persistence for this scenario. By changing the fuel endurance level of the UAV, the 
persistence in monitoring the battlespace by the UAV will vary, hence influencing the 
amount of intelligence collected and comprehensiveness of the situation awareness. 
Outgoing Communications Accuracy of UAV, Infantry and Armored Vehicles–
Other than being timely, these factors determine the accuracy of the information 
disseminated to the required troops. Data links accuracy is important especially in a 
networked environment to ensure information and data get transpired accurately to the 
stakeholders for critical decision-making. 
Sensors Accuracy–Sensor Detection and Classification Accuracy fall under this 
category of parameters that can be varied during the simulation. Sensor detection refers to 
the localization of target when a predetermined energy threshold of the sensor is 
exceeded, while sensor classification refers to the sensor’s capability to accurately match 
the detected target against its database, to reflect the identity of the target. For this model, 
only sensor classification accuracy will be modified using the specified range.  Sensor 
detection accuracy for all the sensors is not modeled, for they are fairly straight-forward, 
but classification accuracy is the one that is more complicated in design and hence 
determines the overall sensor capability. Without good classification capability, the 
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 intelligence generated will not meet the accuracy requirement despite having good 
detection capability. 
2. Generation of Modeling Data 
The model was evaluated using a 33 design point NOLH, based on Cioppa’s 
designs (see Table 9). The correlation matrix and scatterplot results show well-dispersed 
design points, depicting a well-explored design space of the model. This DOE also has 
sufficiently low correlation between input variables, and good sampling of data points 
required to generate a fair model for study (see both Table 12 and Figure 30).  It should 
be noted that a more exhaustive experimental design is recommended for future analysis, 
but time constraints prevented utilization of such a design for this study.  A suggested 
design for follow on work is presented in Chapter V.  The suggested design has improved 
























Minimium 1 10 1 1 60 85 85 85 85 85
Maximum 5 120 20 8 110 100 100 100 100 100
Metric # sec sec sec sec % % % % %
1 5 20 9 2 6240 94 95 92 100 95
2 5 120 3 4 4980 88 96 90 99 92
3 5 58 18 2 3720 94 96 85 90 100
4 5 13 10 3 5640 96 91 93 86 87
5 5 113 7 3 4920 88 87 98 85 93
6 4 62 19 3 3600 95 91 99 98 85
7 4 38 5 5 5760 90 85 88 94 94
8 4 82 6 6 4260 93 86 91 98 88
9 4 34 15 8 4620 86 87 87 91 94
10 4 89 13 8 5880 100 92 91 88 87
11 4 75 8 7 4080 93 99 96 89 97
12 4 31 17 7 4740 85 95 96 96 90
13 4 79 12 8 6060 99 93 95 97 96
14 3 106 20 4 6420 87 97 86 92 86
15 3 86 19 3 6300 89 88 100 93 99
16 3 27 5 5 5400 87 100 97 90 89
17 3 65 11 5 5100 93 93 93 93 93
18 3 24 1 5 3780 98 88 99 93 99
19 3 44 2 6 3900 96 97 85 92 86
20 3 103 16 4 4800 98 85 88 95 96
21 3 99 4 2 5460 100 90 89 89 95
22 2 72 3 7 6480 91 89 100 95 85
23 2 68 2 6 6600 90 94 86 87 100
24 2 93 16 4 4440 95 100 97 91 91
25 2 48 15 3 5940 92 99 94 87 97
26 2 96 6 1 5580 99 98 98 94 91
27 2 41 8 1 4380 85 93 94 97 98
28 2 55 13 2 6120 92 86 89 96 88
29 2 51 9 1 4140 86 92 90 88 89
30 1 110 12 7 3960 91 90 93 85 90
31 1 10 18 5 5220 97 89 95 86 93
32 1 117 11 6 4560 89 94 92 99 98
33 1 17 14 6 5280 97 98 87 100 92  
Table 9.   NOLH Design Space for ISR Model for 33 Design Points 
 
Table 10.   Correlation Table for the Design of Factors 
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Figure 29.  Scatterplot Matrix for 33 Design Points 
H. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions are made for this DOE in the defined scenario: 
• Intelligence from HHQ has been circulated to the Battalion S2 prior to 
mission, hence predetermining the disposition and route of advancement of 
the BLUE troops 
• The link from UAV to Unmanned Ground Station (UGS) and from UGS to 
Battalion HQ is treated as non-existent. In addition, the latency in information 
processing and dissemination from Battalion HQ to CAU HQ is also 
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 disregarded. In this model, data latency of UAV results from discrepancy in 
collection and dissemination of the intelligence, down to CAU HQ and troops. 
• All intelligence sent to individual agents’ HQ is assumed to be updated to 
CAU HQ instantaneously 
• Workload of the mechanized crew are not considered 
• Fatigue level of the soldiers are not taken into consideration 
• Payload of UAV is not varied throughout the simulation 
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 V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. RESULTS 
1. Main Effects Regression Model 
The main effects regression model is first constructed to analyze the relationship 
between the ISR parameters and the FER. The low R2 and Adjusted R2 values, 0.494 and 
0.265 respectively, reflect a small variability of the real data is being captured (see Figure 
30). This means that the relationship between the parameters and FER is not linear; a 
more complicated relationship such as quadratic effects is present in the interactions 
among the parameters and FER. While this model is not appropriate for detailed analysis, 
it may provide initial insights that can inform the validity of future models.  The initial 
analysis shows that the outgoing communications accuracy of the armored vehicles has a 
significant effect on the FER, as explained by the low p-value of 0.0035 (<0.05). The 
positive relationship shows that the FER increases as the communications accuracy 
improves. This is expected when communications accuracy of the BLUE force becomes 
better, since the FER is defined as the ratio of RED casualty to the BLUE casualty. The 
prediction profiler in Figure 31 further supports this analysis. As outgoing 
communications accuracy of the armored vehicles improves, better communication exist 
between the agents and therefore building better situation picture of the battlefield, 
enhancing the situation awareness of the BLUE troops. 
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Figure 30.  Main Effects Model for the Force Exchange Ratio (FER) 
The prediction profiler also shows the number of UAVs, outgoing 
communications accuracy of the infantry troops and the sensor classification probability 
of the UAV are the other significant parameters in increasing the FER of the battle (see 
Figure 31, boxed in red). This is expected, since with more UAVs, wider area of the 
battlefield can be covered, giving more comprehensive situation picture. The high 
classification capability of the UAV will ensure the targets detected are identified 
correctly, allowing the commander to make correct decisions on the battlefield. Better 
outgoing communications accuracy of the troops will also allow better information flow 
within the network. These factors will lead to the BLUE force having better situation 
awareness of the battlespace and therefore increasing the RED casualty and hence FER. 
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Figure 31.  Prediction Profiler for Force Exchange Ratio (FER) – Main Effects Model 
2. Interaction and Quadratic Regression Model 
An expanded model is now considered, which allows for examination of the 
linear and quadratic effects of the ten design parameters on the FER. A stepwise analysis 
is first conducted to determine the significant factors in the model. They are subsequently 
used to produce the interaction regression model for analysis. The step history of the JMP 
stepwise regression tool shows candidate regression equations.  Figure 32 highlights the 
selected regression equation; the model has a R2 value of 0.9044 and is selected for 
regression analysis on the factors involved. 
 
Figure 32.  Step History of the Selected ISR Parameters 
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Figure 33.  Interaction Regression Model 
The Adjusted R2 of the corresponding set of parameters now exhibits a high value 
of 0.830 (see Figure 33). This means that 83% of the variability of the data is being 
captured by the interaction model, and the R2 value of 0.9044 is not artificially inflated 
by the inclusion of a large number of terms in the model. As such, this is a fair model to 
be used for interaction study between the parameters and their corresponding response on 
the FER. The parameter estimates from Figure 34 highlight the following seven 
parameters and interactions that have significant impact on FER, with statistically 
significant p-values (<0.05): 
• Outgoing communications accuracy of Armored Vehicles (p-value <0.0001) 
• Outgoing communications accuracy of Infantry (p-value = 0.0099) 
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 • Sensor classification probability of UAV (p-value = 0.0200) 
• The number of UAVs (p-value <0.0001) 
• Interaction between number of UAV and Outgoing communications accuracy 
of Infantry (p-value = 0.0367) 
• Interaction between number of UAV and UAV latency (p-value = 0.0022) 
• UAV latency (p-value <0.0001) 
The first six factors are in line with the expectation that, when these parameters 
are improved, situation awareness of the battlefield is also greatly enhanced, thereby 
increasing the FER of the battlefield, which implied an increase in BLUE unit 
survivability. The only parameter that seem to deviate from norm is the UAV latency, as 
it is expected to show a corresponding drop in FER (decrease in RED casualty) when 
there is an increase in UAV latency. One possible explanation for this deviation from 
norm is the range where the UAV latency is being varied. The current range of 1 to 8 
seconds might be too narrow for the model to simulate accurately the effect of UAV 
latency on the FER. From the prediction profiler in Figure 34, the UAV latency showed a 
concave behavior with FER, which may show a drop in FER if the range of this 
parameter is widened. 
 
Figure 34.  Prediction Profiler for Force Exchange Ratio (FER) – Interactions Model 
Another way to study the eccentric behavior of UAV latency is to review the 
interaction plots between UAV latency and the number of UAVs. The interaction plot is 
shown in Figure 35. With reference to the interaction plot between the number of UAVs 
and the UAV Latency, when there is only one UAV, the increase in UAV latency does 
not seem to have much effect on the FER. However when UAVs are increased to five, the 
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 plot shows an increasing FER. This indicates that, when there are five UAVs present, 
increasing the latency of the UAV information actually increases the FER. Explicitly, this 
means that having information updates less frequently is good for the Blue Force.  This 
seems counter intuitive, and may just be an artifact of the simulation.  This requires 
explanation. In the simulation, a small latency and a large number of UAVs, means that 
each agent is getting information updated constantly.  Because each agent must re-
prioritize this information, it may be creating a delay in action based on this excess of 
information.  This indicates that, at least in this simulation, too much information causes 
confusion.  Future work can utilize a more detailed simulation to investigate whether this 
phenomenon is an artifact of MANA’s communication structure, or whether this 
“information paralysis” can actually occur, and be accounted for in operations. Therefore, 
it emphasizes that there may be some “right amount” of information, and that having the 
absolute maximum amount of information possible may not be a good thing. 
 
Figure 35.  Interaction Plots of UAV Latency vs Number of UAVs 
B. FUTURE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS 
As noted in Chapter IV, a more exhaustive experimental design should be 
considered in future work (it was not possible for this work due to time constraints).  
Using the data in Table 8, nine continuous and one discrete (number of UAV) factors of 
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 design are generated using NOLH. A total of 365 combinations of the factors are 
generated. For this model, each combination is replicated 30 times to achieve 
randomization of the design space, amounting to a total of 10,950 runs. The NOLH 
design space for this model is show in Table 11. 
 
Table 11.   NOLH Design Space for ISR Model for 365 Design Points 
Next, the correlation of the variables is investigated using a pairwise correlation 
matix (see Table 12). Ideally, the correlation between these design factors should be as 
low as possible, so that any change in one variable is independent of the other, therefore 
making the results easily interpreted. When there is strong correlation between any 
variables, the standard deviation of the regression coefficients become inflated, hence 
lowering the significance of the model the coefficients. This means the variables can be 
combined since they generate the same insight on the outcome of. For this model design, 
the degree of correlation between the variables is referenced against the “r” value of 0.1. 
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 This threshold value has been used in the Cost Estimation lecture taught under the 
Systems Engineering Department in NPS. As a rule of thumb for determining 
multicollinearity, for r≤0.1, there is no issue. The generated pairwise matrix of the 
variables in Table 11 shows the largest r value of 0.0283. As such, the model is confident 
of delivering results that reflect accurately the impact of each variable change, 
independent of one another. 
 
Table 12.   Correlation Table for the Design of Factors 
The space-filling behavior of this DOE can be studied from the scatterplot matrix 
shown in Figure 36. The scatterplot matrix reflects the pairwise projections of the full 
design onto each pair of factors, and is a useful way to show the design’s space-filling 
characteristics (Sanchez 2005). Figure 36 shows well-dispersed design points within 
individual plot, depicting a well-explored design space of the model. This DOE has 
sufficiently shown low correlation, and good sampling of data points required to generate 
a fair model for study. 
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Figure 36.  Scatterplot Matrix for 365 Design Points 
C. ANALYSIS 
Earlier in Chapter IV, two classes of variants are defined where the parameters 
affecting ISR system effectiveness and integration can be grouped into: Sensor 
effectiveness variant and the COP variant. The results from the modeling and simulation 
reveal the following parameters that have a significant impact on the overall unit FER 
and survivability, under the respective variant type: 
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 Sensor Effectiveness Variant 
• Outgoing communications accuracy of Armored Vehicles 
• Outgoing communications accuracy of Infantry 
• Sensor classification probability of UAV 
COP Variant 
• The number of UAVs 
• Interaction between number of UAV and Outgoing communications accuracy 
of Infantry 
• Interaction between number of UAV and UAV latency 
• UAV latency 
The sensor effectiveness variant looks at performance of sensors in generating 
information advantage for the BLUE force. As such, system parameters affecting ISR 
sensor accuracy in identifying and engaging the adversary are studied under this variant. 
The simulation results indicate outgoing communications accuracy of Infantry and 
Armored Vehicles, and the sensor classification accuracy of the UAV to have significant 
impact on ISR system operational effectiveness. When sensor classification accuracy of 
the UAV is enhanced, targets are identified with higher fidelity, thus enabling ground 
commanders to make decision with precision. Enhanced outgoing communications 
accuracy of the troops and armored vehicles allow information to be transpired without 
distortion, which inevitably builds better situation awareness of the battlefield. These 
factors give high FER, which reflects lesser BLUE force being annihilated during the 
battle, signifying accurate information flow among the agents and situation picture of the 
battlefield. 
The COP variant is used as an approximation to study the outcome of sensor 
integration and the overall changes in situation awareness, by manipulating the timeliness 
and persistence involved in building up the operational picture. In the model, the effects 
of sensors integration and the overall changes in situation awareness of the combined 
arms unit are simulated through system parameters that affect the timing and building up 
of situation picture. The three functionalities identified earlier to have impact on COP 
variant are UAV persistence, the number of UAVs and latency of information from 
UAV, Armored Vehicles and Infantry. 
 66 
 The simulation results show the quantity of the UAVs has a significant influence 
over the build up of situation picture and its comprehensiveness. When information of 
interest on the monitored area(s) by the different UAVs are properly fused and shared 
among the units in the combined arms unit, enhanced situation awareness (high FER) is 
achieved, as evidently reflected via the COP variant. Coupled with UAV latency, which 
determines the timeliness of the information being disseminated to the respective units, 
these parameters show how connectivity and data sharing are achieved as part of system 
integration. This is discussed earlier in Chapter III under ISR System Integration 
Architecture, depicted by Figure 7: Enterprise Integration Architecture by Giachetti 2010. 
While the result from UAV latency remains inconclusive from this simulation, it does 
show that its strong influence over the integration of the sensors. 
These seven parameters identified from the simulation results show ISR systems 
operational effectiveness and integration can be achieved, by enhancing sensor 
effectiveness, and building a more responsive and comprehensive situation picture, as 
part of enhancement to force protection and system survivability. 
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 VI. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
Highlighted in the ISR-Integrated Capstone Strategic Plan (ICSP), DoD’s ISR 
capabilities will need to be melded into a system of systems that ties sensors, platforms, 
planners and shooters together in one global network in order to fight effectively. This 
network provides an overarching capability that will provide assured and actionable 
intelligence from single source and fused sensors by creating a fully integrated ISR SoS 
for effective collection, processing and dissemination within the global network (Corsano 
2003). 
In this thesis, work was done to determine impact of ISR system effectiveness and 
integration on the overall unit survivability, by analyzing their impact on the battlespace 
awareness. The parameters identified to influence the capability needs of any ISR 
systems are streamlined into sensor effectiveness variant and COP variant. Both variants 
are modeled, and with their FER response outcome analyzed and compared. Results from 
the simulation have proven that superior sensor effectiveness coupled with a number of 
sensors working together are indeed able to generate intelligence that greatly enhances 
the overall battlespace awareness, as compared to one lone sensor. This has proven that 
when data accumulated from multiple heterogeneous sensors are not able to be shared, 
the capabilities to fulfill missions are greatly reduced, if not limited (Essendorfer 2009). 
Such ISR system effectiveness and integration is made possible with advanced 
technologies available today. As battlefield becomes more sophisticated, decision making 
anchors very much on the intelligence collected and therefore, the ISR systems of today 
are desired to be able to deliver intelligence that is timely, accurate and persistent. In this 
scenario of a combined arms unit, the deployment of capable assets such as the RQ-11 
Raven UAV providing live video coverage and long flight endurance, the modernized 
Abrams tanks with digital data bus and radio interface unit that communicates a common 
picture among the rest of the M1A2s, as well as the System Enhancement Package (SEP) 
and the Improved Bradley acquisition system (IBAS) on the Bradleys that enhances 
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 situational awareness and improves target acquisition and target engagement, are 
indication of the importance of situation awareness in a battle. The enhancement in 
sensors effectiveness and system’s architecture and design (modularity, connectivity and 
data sharing capability) are some of the materiel approaches to improve ISR effectiveness 
and system integration, across domains. 
While this study shows with that enhanced sensors and properly integrated ISR 
system is able to achieve positive impact on the Force Exchange Ratio, and hence the 
overall battlespace awareness leading to overall unit survivability, the integration of such 
disparate array of sensor systems might be challenging, if without appropriate measures 
and policies in place. STANAGs, NIIA and the DCGS are some of the non-materiel 
approaches that provide the necessary framework in enabling system development to 
achieve interoperability. This is particularly crucial in today’s context, since successful 
integration of an ISR system also means moving away from Service/platform-oriented 
collection operations, and toward capability needs operations, which provide a built-in 
agility and flexibility for collectors to response to the dynamic environment (Corsano 
2003). This is also the future of how war will be fought as weapon systems and 
technology gets more advanced and sophisticated. Therefore, non-materiel approaches 
guide ISR system integration, in particular cross-domain systems, which span across 
different operational users and stakeholders. As such, both materiel and non-materiel 
approaches discussed above have significant influence over ISR system effectiveness and 
integration; maximizes force protection and survivability, by deploying appropriately and 
accordingly to operational needs and requirements. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The value of a warfare (or combat) simulation is directly related to the credibility 
of its representations of real-world military operation; equipment and systems; and 
environmental factors (Andrew J. Duck n.d.). As of today, systems acquisition is usually 
done based on the Services’ operational needs and identified capabilities gaps. With that, 
new capabilities are developed and if needed, integrated to existing systems as part of a 
larger System of Systems interoperability framework. However, existing Army 
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 capabilities to model ISR systems are not suited to examine Army ISR related issues, 
such as the assessment of the overall value of such integration effort and whether the 
money spent on the newer capabilities is worthwhile. While there are existing studies on 
simulation related to ISR sensor systems, the domain is limited. One such research that 
came across was on “Assessing the Impact of C4ISR Alternatives with The Joint Warfare 
System” by Horn (2002). This study uses the Joint Warfare System (JWARS), an 
emerging set of modeling and simulation tools that provides multi-sided and balanced 
representation of the Joint Theater warfare, to model the C4ISR concepts in the area of 
C2, enhanced ISR operations and network-centric warfare (Horn 2002). Such tools can be 
used to model the ISR system parameters on their impact on situation awareness, using 
the same scenario in this thesis, at the combined arms level, instead of Joint Warfare 
level. 
As with Major Treml’s thesis where MANA can be used to evaluate the system 
specifications in the overall capability framework before actual acquisition starts, the 
same concept can be applied to the ISR arena. Simulation tools such as MANA and 
JWARS can be used to assess the intelligence value of existing ISR assets of a given 
combat unit. The results from the simulation will facilitate decision makers in fine-tuning 
the capabilities desired to fill the identified needs or gaps. Such modeling tools are also 
able to evaluate the effectiveness on the level of integration and interoperability of the 
ISR assets owned by the Service or combat units. This can be done by scaling the level of 
operations accordingly, as well as depending on the aspects of ISR architecture and 
integration that require such study. 
In this thesis, one component of the ISR system is not modeled: human-sensor 
interaction. This thesis focuses mainly on the capability of the sensors present in the 
CAU and their impact on unit survivability. One possibility for future work is to include 
modeling efforts that involves ISR systems that look to decision-making process between 
the human operator and the ISR asset he is operating (Veverka 2005). This can be done 
by adding the 300s from UAV data latency in Major Treml’s model to the sensor latency 
variation used in this thesis. This gives a more holistic sensor data latency study as part of 
the overall ISR framework. In addition, it is also recommended to widen the range of the 
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 UAV latency than what is currently being modeled, so as to have better clarity on its 
behavior with respect to the unit FER. 
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